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Abstract 
 
We develop a dynamic capital valuation model in which each farm can take an action with farm-
varying cost to increase the probability of not contracting a disease. In the presence of infection 
externalities, circumstances are identified under which multiple equilibria exist and where the 
one involving the most extensive set of action takers is socially optimal. It is suggested that 
costly capital markets are one factor in determining the extent of endemic disease in a region. 
The introduction of frictions, such as dealing with a cumbersome veterinary public health 
bureaucracy, can enhance social welfare by encouraging precautionary biosecurity actions. Some 
technical innovations can reduce social welfare. The model is also extended to study a voluntary 
herd depopulation scheme. Moral hazard in the biosecurity action will dampen the scheme’s 
welfare effect. 
 
Keywords: biosecurity, continuous time, multiple equilibria, Nash behavior, reinfection.  
 
JEL classification: D20, H4, Q1 
Behavioral Incentives, Equilibrium Endemic Disease, and Health Management Policy for 
Farmed Animals 
Endemic infectious animal diseases generate a variety of significant adverse economic 
consequences. Most directly, mortality, morbidity, barrenness, and miscarriage in production 
animals reduce technical efficiency. Costly treatments and altered management practices to 
ameliorate these losses also reduce profitability. Opportunities for trade within and between 
regions may be curtailed. In addition, some infectious animal diseases, such as bovine 
tuberculosis, brucellosis, avian influenza, and possibly Johne’s disease, have adverse 
consequences for human health (Smith 1958; Myers and Steele 1969; National Academies 2003, 
2005).  
For these and other reasons, most countries invest in veterinary public health infrastructure. 
At the transnational level the United Nations, through its Food and Agricultural Organization and 
the World Health Organization units, seeks to facilitate better management of infectious animal 
diseases. The OIE, funded by countries but outside the United Nations structure, has more 
emphatic objectives in this regard. Many control policies, such as animal quarantine, human 
movement controls, border inspections, vaccinations, and mandatory testing schemes, also 
involve economic losses. In some cases, control places impositions on environmental benefits 
(Horan and Wolf 2005).  
A large applied modeling literature has emerged at the interface of preventative veterinary 
medicine and economics (Perry, McDermott, and Randolph 2001; Chi et al. 2002; Bennett 2003; 
Mintiens et al. 2003). Some of this literature regards understanding and costing control and 
eradication strategies upon the event of an epidemic outbreak (Mahul and Gohin 1999). Some 
regards understanding and costing such strategies for endemic disease. Bicknell, Wilen, and 
Howitt (1999) include private incentives in their model of bovine tuberculosis control. 
Surprisingly, however, with the exception of the latter article and a pair of papers to be discussed 
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below, scholarship appears to have been silent on characterizing the economic nature of the 
equilibrium extent of endemic disease.1   
That there is an economic dimension to endemic animal disease becomes apparent upon 
perusing any introductory animal/poultry production book, such as those by Ensminger (1992) or 
Gillespie (2002). Costly management strategies such as selective purchasing of feeder animals, 
implementing labor-consuming hygiene regimes, and timely equipment replacement are 
advocated. Beyond this, infection is an externality of a very public variety. A cursory assessment 
might suggest that developments in applied game theory should hold promise for better 
understanding the extent of endemic animal disease, and how to manage it. The intent of this 
article is to build a model to this end.  
Hennessy (2005) has considered private actions to guard against spatial spread of a disease 
already in a region to conclude that the way in which farm actions behave as local substitutes can 
lead to peculiar spatial patterns in taking protective actions. That paper also considered the risk 
of disease entry into a region. Then efforts by producers are more likely to complement, so that 
policies to promote inter-farm communication should be beneficial.  
The work most closely related to the content of the present article is in Hennessy, Roosen, 
and Jensen (2005). In it, two models are developed to address the strategy of internally supplying 
feeder animals for fattening. One looks at the externalities created by trading to take private 
advantage of feeder animal production cost differentials. The other looks at the internal 
organization of production to protect against the risk of disease entry into a farm. Both models 
are non-temporal in structure, viewing static farm decisions in which no distinction is made 
between farm disease statuses. This is an important limitation because in reality farms differ in 
the extent of disease. Farms transition between disease-free and diseased conditions over time, 
and this status heterogeneity drives much of public disease management policy. As a result, the 
                                                 
1 Perhaps more surprisingly, the body of work on the economics of infectious human diseases is 
also very limited. Three examples are Kremer (1996), and Geoffard and Philipson (1996, 1997). 
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models are very limited in what they can say about the nature of incentives to protect against 
disease and the consequences of such control practices as testing, movement controls, and herd 
depopulation.  
In this paper we will develop a continuous-time dynamic model of farm-level capital values 
in which disease status is influenced by farm actions but is still stochastic. The approach is to use 
a stochastic model of transitions between two disease states in order to value firms in either state, 
and so to characterize incentives to change the state transition probabilities. Similar models have 
been used elsewhere in economics, where the best-known application is perhaps that of 
efficiency wage and involuntary unemployment by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).2 We will lean 
quite heavily on parts of their model, although the interesting economics differ fundamentally. In 
our case the public goods externality of infectious disease is of interest whereas in their case it is 
the resource inefficiency effects of a moral hazard problem with no non-market externalities that 
is of interest.  
The efficiency wage argument is that the incentive for an employee to apply productive 
effort that is incompletely monitored depends in part on the monitoring technology and in part on 
the reward differential. If the expected net present value of becoming unemployed as a result of 
shirking is not too low, the workers will logically shirk unless wages are raised. But then the 
labor market may not clear because the wage rate exceeds the marginal value product at full 
employment. While monitoring and involuntarily idle resources are of no concern to us, a 
parallel between our model and the efficiency wage model is the role of differential incentives in 
encouraging an action.3 
                                                 
2 Moretti and Perloff (2002) provide some empirical support for the efficiency wage theory in 
agricultural labor markets. 
3 This is not to suggest that public disease management policies would never involve attempts to 
monitor farm actions. We choose not to consider farm-level monitoring issues because attempts 
to monitor such actions are rare for infectious animal disease. This is in contrast with food safety 
actions at processing, distribution, and restaurant operations, and some farm-level production 
practices that might harm the environment (e.g., nitrogen application near streams). One class of 
exceptions is the dipping mandate. An example is the sheep scab (psoroptic mange) dipping 
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Our analysis points to the possibility of a multiplicity of equilibrium disease levels. It also 
suggests, in resonance with the efficiency wage model, that ostensibly wasteful public disease 
management programs could conceivably improve social welfare. This could occur by 
encouraging farmers to protect against becoming entangled in the bureaucracy of acquiring 
disease-free status. We show it is also possible that one class of disease management innovations 
could reduce social welfare. This class is comprised of innovations that increase the probability 
of transition from diseased status to disease-free status. The anomalous effect is due to a 
reduction in the loss expected from becoming diseased when externalities ensure that the level of 
protection against disease is socially inadequate. We also apply our model to better 
understanding the effects of a voluntary depopulation (buyout) scheme for infected herds. 
Interestingly, some farms may both act to guard against infection and take a herd buyout 
payment upon becoming infected. The extent of social benefit from a buyout scheme will be 
constrained by moral hazard. A brief discussion concludes. 
 
Framework 
There are N  animal-husbanding farms in a region where N  is a large number, and all farms 
face the same incentives. Farm decision-makers are risk-neutral and are possessed of identical 
technological opportunities, with the exception of the cost of taking a biosecurity action against a 
disease. Even if this cost is common, however, it is not necessarily true that farms are identical 
because we will show that some may be infected with an endemic disease while some are not. 
Infection is endogenous to our model, and we need to first develop the incentive structures facing 
farm decision-makers.  
The model is in continuous time, and farms can be in one of the two states “disease-free” and 
“diseased” at any time. A disease-free farm earns profit flow R  gross of any biosecurity action. 
A diseased farm earns profit flow R δ−  gross of any biosecurity action, where [0, ]Rδ ∈ . A 
                                                                                                                                                             
mandate that was in place in the United Kingdom between 1972 and 1992. 
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farm’s disease status is held to be readily ascertainable at no cost.4 There are no human health 
externalities.5 A biosecurity action designed to maintain disease-free status costs e  to a farm 
where e  has continuously differentiable mass distribution ( ) : [0, ] [0, ]F e e N→  with point 
density ( )f e ; i.e., we treat farms as a continuum.6   
If a disease-free farm takes the action then there is probability ( ) [0,1]b ⋅ ∈  per unit time that 
it becomes diseased.7 The value of ( )b ⋅  is written as an unspecified function because it depends 
on the extent of infection in the region. We will return to specify this relationship in due course. 
If the action is not taken then the probability per unit time of becoming diseased changes to ( )b ⋅  
( ) [ ( ),1]q b+ ⋅ ∈ ⋅ . The value of ( )q ⋅  also depends on the extent of infection in the region. For the 
diseased farm, there is probability ( ) [0,1]a ⋅ ∈  per unit time that the farm becomes disease-free. 
The value of ( )a ⋅ , too, depends on the extent of infection in the region, and we will return to this 
relationship when we are ready to close the model. All of ( )a ⋅ , ( )b ⋅ , and ( )q ⋅  are assumed to be 
continuous and differentiable in the usual sense. 
 
                                                 
4 Some degree of information asymmetry in disease status is likely, but we will show that 
excessive levels of endemic disease need have nothing to do with observable disease status. 
5 Slight re-specifications of our model would allow for introducing human health externalities 
imposed on consumers. One way of doing this is to divide δ  into farmδ  and humanδ , farmδ δ= +  
humanδ , where the farm internalizes farmδ  but where intervention is required for the farm to 
internalize humanδ . 
6 The sorts of costs we have in mind include costs of labor and supplies for cleaning, as well as 
management time to acquire information about, educate, and monitor workers, feed suppliers, 
transport contractors, and others who move regularly between farms. Other costs are veterinary 
prophylactic expenditures, and capital expenditures on such projects as buildings (perhaps 
especially ventilation systems) and boundary maintenance. 
7 For readers familiar with continuous-time treatment of Poisson processes, one may think of 
( )b ⋅  as the rate parameter. See Taylor and Karlin (1984) or Hoel, Port, and Stone (1987) for 
extensive developments on this tool and other related tools.  
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Solution 
The decision on taking an action is essentially one of discounted present valuation of farms 
under the different decisions, and farm businesses are held to be infinitely lived entities.8 Four 
valuations are of concern. One is that of farm value when the farm is disease-free and the action 
is taken, DFaΦ . Another is that of farm value when the farm is disease-free and the action is not 
taken, DFnaΦ . The third is that of farm value when the farm is diseased and the action would be 
taken were it not diseased, DaΦ . And the fourth is that of farm value when the farm is diseased 
and the action would not be taken were it not diseased, DnaΦ .  
With continuous-time discount rate 0r > , a disease-free farm taking the action has asset 
value that must satisfy9 
(1) ( )( ).DF D DFa a ar R e bΦ = − + ⋅ Φ −Φ  
The left-hand side, DFarΦ , is the time value of the asset. It must equal the sum of instantaneous 
income per unit of time conditional upon being disease-free, R e− , and the expected capital loss 
that would arise were the state to change, ( )( )D DFa ab ⋅ Φ −Φ .  
On the other hand, a disease-free farm not taking the action has asset value that must satisfy 
(2) [ ( ) ( )]( ).DF D DFna na nar R b qΦ = + ⋅ + ⋅ Φ −Φ  
Again, each side has an income stream interpretation. On the right-hand side the income flow 
from the present state is larger than in (1), but the probability rate of capital loss is also larger. A 
diseased farm that would take the action has asset value that must satisfy 
(3) ( )( ),D DF Da a ar R aδΦ = − + ⋅ Φ −Φ  
while a diseased farm that would not take the action has asset value that must satisfy 
(4) ( )( ).D DF Dna na nar R aδΦ = − + ⋅ Φ −Φ  
                                                 
8 If sold, then a diseased farm would presumably fetch less than a disease-free farm. 
9 See page 436 in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The adaptation to our context is straightforward. 
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Clearly there is a cut-off point, labeled eˆ  and as yet to be determined, such that (I) 
max[ , ]DF DF DFa na aΦ Φ =Φ  on ˆe e≤ , and (II) max[ , ]DF DF DFa na naΦ Φ =Φ  on ˆe e> .10   
Case I: Assume first that ˆe e≤  so that (1) and (3) are to be solved as a system, with solution 
[ ( )] ( )(5 ) ;
[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
( ) [ ( )](5 ) .
[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
D
a
DF
a
R r b eaa
r r r a b r r a b
R b e r ab
r r r a b r r a b
δ
δ
+ ⋅ ⋅Φ = − −+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
⋅ + ⋅Φ = − −+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
 
These equations might be best explained by taking the difference; 
(6) .
( ) ( )
DF D
a a a
e
r a b
δ −Δ = Φ −Φ = + ⋅ + ⋅  
The change in farm value arising from contracting the disease may be viewed as bond debt 
requiring payment of the cash-flow difference eδ −  at discount rate ( ) ( )r a b+ ⋅ + ⋅ . It is certainly 
true that eδ ≥  on ˆe e≤  because δ  is at risk in the non-diseased state and e  is incurred in that 
state with the hope of protecting against the loss of δ . If ( )b ⋅  becomes larger then the change in 
farm value in (6) will become smaller. This is because the likelihood of shortly becoming 
diseased increases. Similarly, if ( )a ⋅  becomes larger then the change in farm value will also 
become smaller. This is because the state of being diseased has become less consequential since 
the likelihood of soon revisiting the disease-free state has become larger. 
Case II: Assume instead that ˆe e>  so that (2) and (4) are a system, with solution 
[ ( ) ( )](7 ) ;
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ( )](7 ) .
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
D
na
DF
na
R r b qa
r r r a b q
R b qb
r r r a b q
δ
δ
+ ⋅ + ⋅Φ = − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
⋅ + ⋅Φ = − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
 
In this case the difference is 
(8) 0,
( ) ( ) ( )
DF D
na na na r a b q
δΔ = Φ −Φ = ≥+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
                                                 
10 We have allocated ˆe e=  to the action. Throughout we maintain the convention that an agent 
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where two distinctions emerge relative to (6). Effort is not subtracted in the numerator because 
these firms do not take the biosecuring effort. The result is that a further discounting factor, ( )q ⋅ , 
is introduced in the denominator. 
Comparing (5b) with (7b), the action is taken under the disease-free state if DF DFa naΦ ≥Φ  or 
(9) ( ) ˆ ; ( ) ( ) ( ).
( ) ( )
qJ e e c a b
r c q
δ ⋅= ≡ ≥ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅+ ⋅ + ⋅  
Calculate the difference between (6) and (8): 
(10) 
ˆ
.
( )
DF D DF D
a na a a na na
e e
r c
−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Δ − Δ = Φ −Φ − Φ −Φ =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ + ⋅  
Thus, the capitalized benefit to the farm upon having the good fortune of becoming disease-free 
is larger for those who act than for those who do not act on the cost set where farms do act, i.e., 
where ˆe e≤ . This also, not coincidently, characterizes the set of farms that do act.11 
From (9), the measure of farms that would seek to biosecure were they disease-free is  
(11) ( )ˆ( ) .
( ) ( )
qF e F
r c q
δ⎛ ⎞⋅≡ ⎜ ⎟+ ⋅ + ⋅⎝ ⎠  
Intuition would suggest that ( )b ⋅  and ( ) ( )b q⋅ + ⋅  should both be decreasing in the extent of 
adoption, as measured by the value of ˆ( )F e  or the value of eˆ . The probabilistic rate of farm 
infection for a given farm should decrease with the fraction of farms that biosecure, and this 
should be true whether (i.e., with ( )b ⋅  probability rate) or not (i.e., with ( ) ( )b q⋅ + ⋅  probability 
rate) the farm in question biosecures. As for ( )a ⋅  it should be at worst invariant to, and perhaps 
increase with, the fraction of farms that biosecure. This is because there are then fewer 
opportunities to become infected, so that the effect of the extent of adoption on the value of ( )c ⋅  
is ambiguous.  
                                                                                                                                                             
acts when indifferent. 
11 View the choice problem in the disease-free state as max[ , ]DF DFa naΦ Φ , thus motivating the 
presence of these two arguments in (10). The other two arguments arise because of the linearity 
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As a reduced form we declare ( )a ⋅ , ( )b ⋅ , and ( )q ⋅  to be functions of eˆ , where a more proper 
specification would be to write them as functions of the adopting set ˆ[0, ]e  under farm 
distribution ( )F e .12 It is important to make some comments at this point in order to avoid later 
confusion. It is most appropriate to think of functions ( )a ⋅ , ( )b ⋅ , and ( )q ⋅  as functions of the set 
of disease-free herds. Set ˆ[0, ]e  may not always be an appropriate indicator in this regard. Policy 
interventions that target high-cost herds may render eˆ  to be an inappropriate reduced-form gauge 
of the extent of disease. But we defer on notation to accommodate this complication until the 
complication presents a modeling problem. From (9) we may write equilibrium as a solution to13 
(12) 
ˆ( )ˆ ˆ( ) .
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
q eJ e e
r c e q e
δ= ≡+ +  
For the continuum of farms this condition, which is the centerpiece of the paper, characterizes 
Nash equilibria.14 If ˆe e<  then a farm with that e  has no unilateral incentive to deviate from 
acting. If ˆe e>  then a farm with that e  has no unilateral incentive to deviate from not acting.15 
To establish the nature of equilibrium, differentiate ( ) ( ) /[ ( ) ( )]J e q e r c e q eδ= + +  to obtain  
(13) 2
[ ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
[ ( ) ( )]
e e
e
r c e q e q e c eJ e
r c e q e
δ + −= + +  
If ( ) 0ec e ≥  and ( ) 0eq e ≥  then (13) implies there is a unique solution to (12) since ( ) 0eJ e ≤  
ˆ ˆ/ 1de de< ≡ . Suppose though that ( ) 0ec e < , as would be the case when ( ) 0ea e = . Then we 
                                                                                                                                                             
of (5a) and (7a) in e .  
12 We could just as well write it as a function of the non-adopting set, ˆ( , ]e e . 
13 When (12) is written as ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) /[ ( ) ( )] /q e r c e q e e δ+ + ≡ , it can be seen that both ratios are unit-
less. Values eˆ  and δ  are both $ per unit time quantities. Expressions r , ˆ( )c e , and ˆ( )q e  all have 
(expected) percent change per unit time interpretations. 
14 As we will use (12) extensively, it should be clear that an elementary understanding of fixed-
point theory would be useful when working with our model. For an economic overview, we refer 
the reader to Milgrom and Roberts (1994) or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). 
15 Function ˆ( )J e  is continuous in eˆ . The domain of e , [0, ]e , is a non-empty, compact, convex 
set. From Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem (p. 952 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995), the 
additional property that ˆ( ) : [0, ] [0, ]J e e e→  is into ensures the existence of a pure-strategy Nash 
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cannot rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria as depicted in figure 1. In it, there are three 
fixed-point solutions to (12). One, the middle one, is unstable to local perturbations. This is 
because ( )J e e<  implies DF DFa naΦ <Φ  and such farms will not act. On the other side of this 
equilibrium, ( )J e e>  implies DF DFa naΦ >Φ  so that these farms will act. In general, ( ) 1eJ e <  
ensures the existence of at most one equilibrium. 
 
Social Optimum 
Note that the long-run stationary probabilities of a farm’s disease states are16 
(14) 
( )ˆProb[diseased | ] ( ), ( ) ;
( ) ( )
( ) ( )ˆProb[diseased | ] ( ), ( ) .
( ) ( ) ( )
be e m m
a b
b qe e u u
a b q
⋅≤ = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅
⋅ + ⋅> = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
 
Observe that ˆ ˆProb[diseased | ] Prob[diseased | ]e e e e≤ < > , i.e., the action reduces the probability 
of disease. Using (14), (5a), (5b), (7a), and (7b), cancellations allow us to write the social 
optimization problem as  
(15) ( )* * * ** * *1 min ( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) ( ) ( ) .e e e e e e eR m e dF e m e edF e u e dF er r δ δ≤ ≤ >= − + − +∫ ∫ ∫L  
Two aspects of expression (15) warrant comment. One is that the interior minimization 
problem makes no reference to r  so that the social optimum in stationary equilibrium is 
independent of r . This is despite the relevance of r  in (12). In stationary equilibrium, farms 
transition between diseased and disease-free states but the discounted present value 
consequences of this are a wash in the aggregate. This is because the flows of farms from and to 
a particular disease state just balance. 
                                                                                                                                                             
equilibrium. 
16 See page 256 in Taylor and Karlin (1984) or page 94 in Hoel, Port, and Stone (1987) for 
extensive developments on stationary probabilities for Poisson-type models. The Prob[ | ]A B  
notation indicates the probability of state A given condition B. 
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The other aspect is that the minimization problem may be broken into three sorts of losses. 
One is 
*
*( ) ( )
e e
m e dF eδ ≤∫ , where * ( )e e dF e≤∫  is the measure of farms taking the action and *( )m e  
is the equilibrium fraction of the time an action-taking farm is diseased. One is 
*
*[1 ( )] ( )
e e
m e edF e≤− ∫ , where * ( )e e edF e≤∫  is the cumulation of action costs over action-taking 
farms while *1 ( )m e−  is the equilibrium fraction of the time an action-taking farm is disease-free 
and incurring the action cost flow. There is also 
*
*( ) ( )
e e
u e dF eδ >∫ , where * ( )e e dF e>∫  is the 
measure of farms not taking the action when disease-free and *( )u e  is the equilibrium fraction of 
the time that such farms are diseased. 
 
When Action-Taking Farms are Disease-Free 
To better understand the optimization problem, assume that ( ) 0b ⋅ ≡  so that a farm taking the 
action is certainly disease-free, ( ) 0m ⋅ ≡ . The social welfare optimization problem in (15) 
reduces to  
(16) * * *
*
* *
0 0 * *
1 ( )min ( ) ( ) | ( ) ; ( ) | ;
( ) ( )b be e e e e
R q eedF e u e dF e u e
r r a e q e
δ = =≤ >⎡ ⎤= − + =⎣ ⎦ +∫ ∫L  
and the optimality derivative is  
(17) 
*
* * * * *
0 0( ) ( ) | ( ) ( ) | ( ) 0.b e b e ee f e u e f e u e dF eδ δ= = >− + =∫  
Write this as  
(18) *
* *
0
* *
0
( ) ( ) | .
( ) ( ) |
e e b
e b
dF e u e e
f e u e
δδ > =
=
−=∫  
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The right-hand side of (18) is increasing if 0( ) |bu e =  is decreasing and convex.
17 These are 
reasonable assumptions because *( )u e  is the long-run equilibrium probability of becoming 
diseased if not an action-taker; see (14). Appealing to the plausibility of diminishing marginal 
returns, an increase in the extent of private effort should decrease that probability and at a 
decreasing rate. The left-hand side of (18) is decreasing if 
*
*( ) / ( )
e e
f e dF e>∫  is increasing, i.e., if 
the hazard rate is increasing. This is the standard assumption of monotone hazard rate, as applied 
in the mechanism design literature (see p. 267 in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).  
In addition, from (12), if the left- and right-hand expressions in (18) are evaluated at some eˆ  
solving (12) then we have ˆ ˆ( ) 0u e eδ − >  and ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( ) ]/ ( ) 0eu e e u eδ − < .18 Since the left-hand side of 
(18) is positive, the value of this eˆ  (arbitrarily chosen when (12) has multiple fixed points) must 
be too small relative to *e . To restore equilibrium for optimal social choice condition (18), 
*ˆ ˆe e e→ >  so that the left-hand side decreases in value and the right-hand side increases in 
value. Therefore, under the assumptions that ( ) 0b ⋅ ≡ , ( )u e  is decreasing and convex and 
Ln ( )
s e
dF s>
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫  is concave in e , then those taking the action should do so and more should also 
do so, i.e., *ˆ[0, ] [0, ]e e⊂ .  
 
Policy Issues 
In this section we discuss some policy implications of the model, as developed to this juncture.  
 
                                                 
17 Differentiate to obtain * * * * * 20 0 0 01/[ ( ) | ] [ ( ) | ] ( ) | /[ ( ) | ]e b b ee b e bu e u e e u e u eδ δ= = = =− − − . This 
expression is positive if * 0( ) | 0e bu e = < , * 0( ) | 0ee bu e = > , and * *0( ) |bu e eδ = < . But the left-hand side 
of (18) is positive under an interior equilibrium while * 0( ) | 0e bu e = <  has been assumed. 
Therefore, * *0( ) |bu e eδ = < . 
18 From (12), if 0b =  then 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) /[ ( ) ( )] ( ) /[ ( ) ( )] ( ) |be q e r a e q e q e a e q e u eδ δ δ == + + < + =  so that 
0ˆ ˆ( ) | 0bu e eδ = − > . 
 13
Point 1: If there are multiple equilibria, then the highest eˆ  value is preferred. 
In light of (18) the likelihood is that too few farms take the action. In light of (12) and figure 1, 
the highest among these equilibria will support the largest level of social welfare.19 The question 
then becomes how to sustain the highest equilibrium. This leads to our next point. 
Point 2: Relative loss determines the incentive to take the action. 
Equation (12) shows that an increase in the value of δ  shifts equilibrium values of eˆ  upward; 
see figure 2. While this may seem intuitive to the point of being obvious, the policy implications 
may not be at all intuitive. We will comment on some of these policy implications now and defer 
others until we develop the model further.  
Bureaucratic costs imposed on farm businesses that become diseased may be a form of 
increasing δ  beyond market penalties. While bureaucracy imposes a burden on taxpayers and 
also incurs grower transactions costs, the result may be a lower level of endemic disease and the 
social gains may more than offset the social losses. It is important to bear in mind that the 
bureaucracy cost need bring with it no disease fighting benefit. Its actions may in no way assist 
in the technical problems associated with eliminating the disease from a farm, and still it can 
serve a positive function. Regulatory restrictions that have little direct merit may also have 
similar effect. For example, a diseased farm may be denied the right to sell produce into a 
premium market (e.g., liquid milk) even though the disease has no impact on the quality of that 
product.  
The point we are making comes close to, but is not the same as, the efficiency wage 
argument. There, the problem is one of moral hazard in the face of imperfect monitoring where 
there are no non-market spillovers beyond the principal and agent in an employment relationship. 
                                                 
19 Continuity, together with ( ) : [0, ] [0, ]J e e e→  into, ensures that the largest equilibrium (call it 
He ) involves ( )H HJ e eε ε− > −  for the smallest 0ε > , [0, ]He eε− ∈ , such that ( )H HJ e eε− ≠  
ε−  and ( )H HJ e eε ε+ < +  for the smallest 0ε > , [0, ]He eε+ ∈ , such that ( )H HJ e eε ε+ ≠ + . 
Unless ( ) | 1
He e e
J e = = , He  is stable. 
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Here, the problem is that non-action creates an external effect in increasing the pool of infectious 
disease.  
Point 3: If 0δ =  then no farm takes the action. 
Solution ˆ 0e =  is then the unique Nash equilibrium solution to (12). In this case, first-best is 
supported because the disease causes no deterioration in production. However, consider the 
different context where disease causes no deterioration in production but the produce is a health 
risk.20 Then ˆ 0e = , first-best would not be supported, and market or non-market intervention 
might improve market performance. Public awareness campaigns might increase demand for 
verified private labeling on the disease status of the originating herd. As with campaigns to 
control bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis, though, produce condemnation may be deemed the 
more effective approach (Smith 1958). 
Point 4: A high discount rate reduces the action threshold. 
Equation (12) shows that an increase in the value of r  shifts equilibrium values of eˆ  downward. 
In countries with inefficient capital markets or low stocks of capital available for investment, one 
would expect higher levels of endemic disease. This is because the present value of the private 
gain from attaining disease-free status is discounted heavily. The reason is distinct from that of 
high endemic disease levels because of capital constraints at the public level, often referred to as 
a reason for disease problems in less developed countries (Leonard 2000).  
Point 5: Some technical innovations can reduce social welfare. 
Suppose that ( ) ( , )b b e θ⋅ ≡  where ( , ) 0b eθ θ < . Parameter θ  represents a technical innovation 
that reduces the probability of contracting a disease. In (12), the left-hand side of the relation 
increases with an increase in θ  so that ˆ / 0de dθ ≥ . As there is likely insufficient action taking, 
the innovation should increase social welfare. To see this, evaluate (15) not at the optimum but 
rather under equilibrium market choice eˆ  so that social welfare may be written as 
                                                 
20 See footnote 5. 
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(19) 
( )ˆ ˆ ˆ1ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ;
( , ) ( , ) ( )( , ) ; ( , ) .
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
e e e e e e
Re m e e dF e edF e u e dF e
r r
b e b e q em e u e
a e b e a e b e q e
θ θ δ δ θ
θ θθ θθ θ
≤ ≤ >= − − + +
+= =+ + +
∫ ∫ ∫L
 
We then have  
(20) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) 1 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( ) ( ) ( ) .
ˆe e e e
d e m e u e e ee dF e dF e
d r r e
θ θ δ θ θδθ θ θ θ≤ >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − − − +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∫ ∫L L  
The first two right-hand terms are certainly positive. We have argued that an increase in eˆ  likely 
increases the value of ˆ( , )e θL , while (12) suggests that ˆ / 0e θ∂ ∂ ≥ . It seems reasonable to 
conclude, then, that ˆ( , ) / 0d e dθ θ ≥L  in this case. 
Now consider instead the case where the innovation affects ( )a ⋅  only; that ( ) ( , )a a e θ⋅ ≡  
with ( , ) 0a eθ θ >  so that the innovation increases the probability of returning a diseased herd to 
the disease-free state. Upon assuming for the sake of simplicity that ( ) 0b ⋅ ≡ , social welfare may 
be written as 
(21) 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ1 ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ); ( , ) .
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( )e e e e
R q ee edF e u e dF e u e
r r r a e q e
δθ θ θ θ≤ >= − − = +∫ ∫L  
The total derivative is 
(22) 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( ) .
ˆe e
d e u e e edF e
d r e
θ δ θ θ
θ θ θ>
∂ ∂ ∂= − +∂ ∂ ∂∫L L  
The first right-hand term is positive, while we also know that ˆ ˆ( , ) / 0e eθ∂ ∂ ≥L  under the 
conditions ( )u e  decreasing and convex, and Ln ( )
s e
dF s>
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫  concave in e . From (12) we have 
that ˆ / 0e θ∂ ∂ ≤  so the sign of the total derivative is ambiguous. The technical innovation may, 
through reducing the cost of becoming diseased, discourage action taking to such an extent that 
the positive direct effect of the innovation is overwhelmed. 
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Voluntary Depopulation Scheme 
Consider now the situation in which the only regulatory intervention is that the government buys 
out a herd when the owner comes forth truthfully, out of self-interest, to report owning a diseased 
herd. The herd is culled with compensation such that farm value becomes K , and it is assumed 
that this certainly clears disease from the farm. The farm is then put back into production.  
Two private decisions are now to be made on each herd, but they are never made at the same 
time. In the disease-free state the decision on taking the biosecurity action has to be made. In the 
diseased state, and more precisely immediately upon contracting the disease, the decision on 
reporting to the government has to be made. Table 1 delineates the four cases that emerge. We 
will consider each of the four cases in turn, and we will then identify the values in ( , )e K  space 
such that a farm makes this pair of decisions. 
Case A: ( , )a nc , or act when disease-free and do not report for culling when diseased. We 
have already solved for this case in (5) above. Using subscript notation, per table 1, to 
characterize the two actions now available the solution is  
(23) , , ,
[ ( )] ( ) ; .
[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
D DF D
a nc a nc a nc
R r b ea e
r r r a b r r a b r a b
δ δ+ ⋅ ⋅ −Φ = − − Φ = Φ ++ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
Case B: ( , )na nc , or do not act when disease-free and do not report for culling when 
diseased. We have also already solved for this case in (7) above. The solution is  
(24) , , ,
[ ( ) ( )] ; .
[ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )
D DF D
na nc na nc na nc
R r b q
r r r a b q r a b q
δ δ+ ⋅ + ⋅Φ = − Φ = Φ ++ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
Case C: ( , )na c , or do not act when disease-free and do report for culling when diseased. 
We have not solved for this problem and must return to first principles. Instead of (2) and (4), 
recognize that farm value upon succumbing to the disease is K  so that the fundamental 
equations become , , ,[ ( ) ( )]( )
DF D DF
na c na c na cr R b qΦ = + ⋅ + ⋅ Φ −Φ  and ,Dna c KΦ = . The system solves as  
(25) , , ,; .( ) ( )
D DF D
na c na c na c
R rKK
r b q
−Φ = Φ =Φ + + ⋅ + ⋅  
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Case D: ( , )a c , or act when disease-free and do report for culling when diseased. We have 
not solved for this problem either. Instead of (1) and (3), acknowledging that farm value upon 
succumbing to the disease is K  requires , , ,( )( )
DF D DF
a c a c a cr R e bΦ = − + ⋅ Φ −Φ  and ,Da c KΦ = . The 
system solves as  
(26) , , ,; .( )
D DF D
a c a c a c
R e rKK
r b
− −Φ = Φ = Φ + + ⋅  
 
When Case A Is Chosen 
The two criteria that must be satisfied in order for this to this occur are , ,
D D
a nc a cΦ >Φ  and 
, ,
DF DF
a nc na ncΦ ≥Φ . Upon using (23), (24), and (26), this reduces to  
(27) ( )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( )] ˆ( ) ; .
( )
R rK r a b r b e K e e e
a
δ− + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ ≡ > ≥⋅
  
Both e  and K  need to be relatively low in order for this case to apply. Further pertinent 
comments on each of the cases are provided in appendix A. 
 
When Case B Is Chosen 
The two criteria that must be satisfied in order for this to occur are , ,
D D
na nc na cΦ >Φ  and ,DFna ncΦ >  
,
DF
a ncΦ . This reduces to  
(28) ,
[ ( ) ( )] ˆ; .
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
D
na nc
R r b q K e e
r r r a b q
δ + ⋅ + ⋅− ≡ Φ > <+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
For this case to apply, e  needs to be relatively high and K  needs to be relatively low. 
 
When Case C Is Chosen 
The criteria that must be satisfied in order that this occur are , ,
D D
na c na ncΦ ≥Φ  and , ,DF DFna c a cΦ >Φ , or 
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(29) ,
( ) ( ); ( ) .
( ) ( )
D
na nc
R rK qK e e K
r b q
+ − ⋅≥ Φ > ≡ + ⋅ + ⋅  
In this case, e  and K  should be comparatively large. 
 
When Case D Is Chosen 
The criteria that must be satisfied are , ,
D D
a c a ncΦ ≥Φ  and , ,DF DFa c na cΦ ≥Φ . These resolve to  
(30) ( ) ( ).e K e e K+≤ ≤  
This case occurs when K  is sufficiently high to make culling attractive, and e  is low enough to 
elicit action but not so low that capital value under a “no cull” decision rises beyond K . 
 
Figure 3 depicts the parameter values for which each of the four possible cases arise. 
Supporting analysis is provided in appendix A. We turn now to the effect of the buyout program 
on the extent of disease. This depends very much on whether ,
D
na ncK ≥ Φ . If ,Dna ncK < Φ , then no 
culling occurs so that (Case A) ˆ( )F e  herds are diseased 100 ( )m ⋅  percent of the time while (Case 
B) ˆ( )N F e−  herds are diseased 100 ( )u ⋅  percent of the time. If ,Dna ncK ≥ Φ , then culling occurs 
immediately upon contraction of disease when Cases C or D apply. This means that (Case A) 
( )F e  herds are diseased 100 ( )m ⋅  percent of the time, (Case D) ( ) ( )F e F e+ −   herds are diseased 
zero percent of the time, and (Case C) ( )N F e+−  herds are diseased zero percent of the time. 
Noticing, from figure 3, that ˆ ˆmin[ , ]e e e=  on ,Dna ncK < Φ  and ˆmin[ , ]e e e=   on ,Dna ncK ≥ Φ , write 
ˆmin[ , ]e e e≡   so that the set of diseased farms is described by the implicitly defined function  
(31) ,
,
( ) [ ( , )] [ ( )] [ ( , )], ;
( , )
( ) [ ( , )], .
D
na nc
D
na nc
F e m w e K N F e u w e K K
w e K
F e m w e K K
⎧ + − < Φ⎪= ⎨ ≥ Φ⎪⎩
       
Rather than (12), the set of acting farms should now satisfy21,22  
                                                 
21 We refer the reader back to the discussion just before equation (12). This is where the 
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(32) [ ( , )]( , ) .
[ ( , )] [ ( , )]
q w e KJ e K e
r c w e K q w e K
δ= ≡+ +
    
The solution to fixed-point problem (31)-(32) is not at all trivial since e  enters ( , )w e K  in 
involved ways and (31) is an implicit function. But note the following concerning (31) and (32). 
Write  
(33) ,
,
( ) [ ( , )] [ ( )] [ ( , )] ( , ), ;
( ) [ ( , )] ( , ), .
D
na nc
D
na nc
F e m w e K N F e u w e K w e K K
F e m w e K w e K K
⎧ + − − < Φ⎪Τ = ⎨ − ≥ Φ⎪⎩
    
    
With [ ] 0wm w ≥  and [ ] 0wu w ≥ , assume that 1 ( ) [ ( , )] [ ( )] [ ( , )]w wF e m w e K N F e u w e K> + −     so 
that Τ  is decreasing in w .23 This is true when ,Dna ncK < Φ  and even more strongly so when K ≥  
,
D
na ncΦ . Figure 4 describes the context. The thick arrow shows that the measure of diseased farms 
contracts inwards as the value of K  increases. Thus, [ ] 0wm w ≥ , [ ] 0wu w ≥ , and 1 ( ) [ ]wF e m> ⋅  
[ ( )] [ ]wN F e u+ − ⋅  ensure that  
(34) ( ) 0,w
K
∂ ⋅ ≤∂  
where partial differential operator ∂  recognizes that e  also depends on K .  
Furthermore,  
(35) 2
[ ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]
w wr c w q w q w c wd q w
dw r c w q w r c w q w
δ δ + −⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎝ ⎠  
With ( ) 0wq w >  (since the probability rate increment due to not biosecuring should increase with 
the stock of diseased farms), if ( ) 0wc w ≤  then (34) implies that the effect of an increase in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
complication in the reduced-form presentation of fixed-point relation (12) occurs. 
22 To be clear, the argument eˆ  in the functions ( )q ⋅  and ( )c ⋅  of (12) represented the fraction of 
farms that biosecure when disease-free. In (32), the argument w  in functions [ ]q ⋅  and [ ]c ⋅  
captures the fraction of farms that are diseased. Thus, the functions are not quite the same across 
equations but the probability relationship captured is the same. 
23 That [ ] 0wm w ≥  and [ ] 0wu w ≥  is because the probability a farm is diseased should increase 
with the region-wide extent of disease. 
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value of K  is to induce a discrete downward shift to the left-hand side of the defining identity in 
(32) when K  surpasses value ,
D
na ncΦ . Figure 5 illustrates.  
Now suppose that ,
D
na ncK ≥ Φ  so that ( , ) ( ) [ ( , )]w e K F e m w e K=    and  
(36) ( , ) ( ) [ ] 0,
1 ( ) [ ]w
w e K f e m w
e F e m w
∂ = >∂ −
 
   
since we have already assumed that 1 ( ) [ ( , )]wF e m w e K>   . The economics of the positive 
relationship between the extent of biosecuring and the extent of disease is that biosecuring and 
culling tend to be substitutes in reducing the extent of disease. From ,
D
na ncK ≥ Φ , we are in the 
branch of (31) such that farms with biosecurity cost above e  cull immediately upon contracting 
the disease and so are only diseased for an instance.24 
Finally, from (34), (36) and ˆ/ min[ , ]/ 0e K e e K∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ≤  in figure 3, we have25 
(37) 
P
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0.
sign sign sign
dw e K w e K w e K e
dK K e K
− + −
∂ ∂ ∂= + ≤∂ ∂ ∂
 
   
  
Thus, the extent of disease does increase with an increase in K  even though the increase in K  
elicits less biosecuring behavior. Indirect effect [ ( , ) / ][ / ]w e K e e K∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    could be considered to be 
a moral hazard effect because the herd buyout program provides insurance against contracting 
the disease.26 Thus, by draining the stock of endemic disease the voluntary depopulation scheme 
could well reduce the incentive to take the protective action. There may be some crowding out so 
that the scheme is not likely to be as effective as a straightforward ex ante calculation might 
suggest.  
 
                                                 
24 On the other branch of (31), [ ] [ ]u m⋅ ≥ ⋅ . Differentiation of ( , ) ( ) [ ]w e K F e m= ⋅ +   
[ ( )] [ ]N F e u− ⋅ , and use of 1 ( ) [ ] [ ( )] [ ]w wF e m N F e u> ⋅ + − ⋅   reverses the sign of (36).  
25 While the derivative is not defined where eˆ e=  , the limits from both sides are non-positive. 
26 Whether the reduction in the equilibrium level of disease justifies the losses due to culled stock 
is beyond the scope of the present analysis, as it would involve extending the model to 
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Action to Become Disease-Free 
In this section we ask whether changing the action from one of securing against a disease to one 
of increasing the likelihood of becoming disease-free changes the nature of the results. Suppose 
that the only action concerns the effort to become disease-free and it may be taken only when the 
farm is diseased. Its effect is to increase ( )a ⋅  to ( ) ( )a q⋅ + ⋅ , whereas before, non-action increased 
( )b ⋅  to ( ) ( )b q⋅ + ⋅ . As before, four values are of concern. These are farm value when the farm is 
(i) diseased where the action is taken, DaΦ ; (ii) diseased where the action is not taken, DnaΦ ; (iii) 
disease-free where the action is taken, DFaΦ ; and (iv) disease-free where the action is not taken,  
DF
naΦ . In all other regards, the model is the same as that which supports (12) above. The solution 
is outlined in appendix B. The analysis supports the biosecurity action criterion  
(38) ( )ˆˆ ;
( ) ( )
qe e
r a b
δ ⋅≤ = + ⋅ + ⋅  
with properties almost identical to those of (12). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has developed a model of endemic animal disease that emphasizes economic 
incentives. The model is quite versatile in that it can be used to study diseases in which only 
livestock productivity is affected and diseases in which only the health of consumers is affected. 
The model emphasizes the role of punishment in strengthening the incentive to protect against 
disease. This role may induce welfare reduction upon the event of an exogenous technical 
innovation that makes regaining disease-free status easier. The model also points to a place for 
well-functioning capital markets in reducing the extent of endemic disease. In order to 
demonstrate the model’s potential for policy analysis, the policy of voluntary reporting for herd 
buyout was developed in some detail. 
                                                                                                                                                             
accommodate salvage value. 
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The analysis might be expanded upon in at least three directions. First, a stationary 
equilibrium has been assumed. A better understanding of adjustment paths would be helpful 
when seeking to better understand responses to external (e.g., weather) and policy-induced 
shocks. Methods in Kimball (1994) could be useful in this regard. The second regards the 
accuracy of tests for a disease. For that issue, our model would have to be adapted to 
accommodate false positive and false negative readings when disease status cannot be 
established from profitability. A speculation is that a test improvement that better identifies herd 
recovery may reduce the incentive to biosecure and so may reduce social welfare. 
The third issue is to introduce scale-related heterogeneities into the model. The relationship 
between size and endemic disease warrants scrutiny because backyard production has been 
suggested as a key propagating factor in disease outbreaks (Olsen et al. 2005; Tiensin et al. 
2005). In addition, agricultural policies that pass the World Trade Organization test of being 
decoupled may encourage smaller growers to stay in business and so may reduce the rate of 
consolidation in animal production (Chau and De Gorter 2005). Biosecurity costs are unlikely to 
be scale-neutral. Some, such as acquiring specialized knowledge of diseases, are likely to carry a 
high fixed cost component. On the other hand, larger production units are more vulnerable to 
heavy losses upon disease entry. Absent strong comparative advantage in the form of labor or 
feed costs, production is unlikely to be concentrated in regions with severe endemic disease 
problems. If a traditional production region with initially fragmented production also has weak 
incentives to protect against disease, the region may be stuck in an inefficient equilibrium. Farms 
in the region may not adopt technical innovations that involve an increase in scale because of the 
disease environment. 
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Appendix A 
When Case A is chosen: A point to note is that ( ) / [ ( ) ( )]/ ( ) 0e K K r r a b a∂ ∂ = − + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ≤ , i.e., that 
one bound on the maximum e  value declines with an increase in the level of buyout 
compensation. Note also that ( ) 0e K =  if  
(A1) 0
[ ( )] 0,
[ ( ) ( )]
R r bK
r r r a b
δ + ⋅≡ − >+ ⋅ + ⋅

 
while ( 0) ( )[ ( )]/ ( )e K R R r b aδ= = + − + ⋅ ⋅ . In particular,  
(A2) ˆ( 0) 0.e K e= − >  
This means that the two bounds specified in (27) intersect on the space ( , ) [0, ] [0, )K e e∈ × ∞  for 
( 0)e e K> = .  
When Case B is chosen: From (A1) and ( ) 0q ⋅ > , we have that 0 ,Dna ncK > Φ

 so the set of K  
values supporting Case A extends beyond the set of K  values supporting Case B. 
When Case C is chosen: Note, ( ) / ( ) / 0de K dK de K dK+< < . Also,  
(A3) ˆ( 0) 0; ( 0) ( 0) 0;e K e e K e K+ += − > = − = >  
so that ˆ( 0) ( 0)e K e K e+= > = > . Finally, use (27) and (29) to show that ( ) ( )e K e K+=  when 
(A4) ,
[ ( ) ( )] ( )ˆ; ( ) ( ) .
[ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )
D
na nc
R r b q qK e K e K e
r r r a b q r a b q
δ δ++ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅= − = Φ = = =+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
  
When Case D is chosen: Is (30) this ever satisfied? If it is, then  
(A5) ( )[ ( ) ( )] [ ( )] ( ) ( ) ,
( ) ( ) ( )
R rK r a b r b R rK qe
a r b q
δ− + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅≤ ≤⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
so that  
(A6) .
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
R rK
r b q r a b q
δ− ≤+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
This will be true whenever ,
D
na ncK ≥ Φ .  
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Appendix B 
The asset value equations are  
(B1) [ ( ) ( )]( ), diseased farm taking action;
(B2) ( )( ), diseased farm not taking action;
(B3) ( )( ), disease-free farm taking action;
(B4) ( )
D DF D
a a
D DF D
na na
DF D DF
a a
DF
na
r R e a q
r R a
r R b
r R b
δ
δ
Φ = − − + ⋅ + ⋅ Φ −Φ
Φ = − + ⋅ Φ −Φ
Φ = + ⋅ Φ −Φ
Φ = + ⋅ ( ), disease-free farm not taking action.D DFnaΦ −Φ
 
Again, there are two cases. 
Case I: Assume first that ˆe e≤  so that (B1) and (B3) apply. Solve to obtain  
[ ( )][ ](B5 ) ;
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
( )[ ](B5 ) .
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
D
a
DF
a
R r b ea
r r r a b q
R b eb
r r r a b q
δ
δ
+ ⋅ +Φ = − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
⋅ +Φ = − + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
 
Case II: Assume next that ˆe e>  so that (B2) and (B4) apply. Solve to obtain 
( )(B6 ) ;
[ ( ) ( )]
[ ( )](B6 ) .
[ ( ) ( )]
DF
na
D
na
R ba
r r r a b
R r bb
r r r a b
δ
δ
⋅Φ = − + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅Φ = − + ⋅ + ⋅
 
We then have D Da naΦ =Φ  when  
(B7) ( )ˆˆ
( ) ( )
qe
r a b
δ ⋅= + ⋅ + ⋅  
Upon comparing with (12) from before we have that ˆˆ ˆe e>  if and only if ( ) 0q ⋅ > , which is 
true. All else equal, more firms will adopt a technology that increases the instantaneous 
probability rate of becoming disease-free than will adopt a technology that increases the 
instantaneous probability rate of staying disease-free. All other effects are as before. 
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Table 1. Decision Environment for Each Farm under Voluntary 
Depopulation Scheme 
 
Diseased state  
Do not cull Cull 
Act ( , )a nc , Case A ( , )a c , Case D Disease-free 
state Do not act ( , )na nc , Case B ( , )na c , Case C 
Figure 1.  Stable and unstable equilibria for farm sets taking 
precaution against contracting endemic disease
e
,
( )
e
J e
e e=
( )J e
ˆ,
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e ˆ,
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e ˆ,
stable
e
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Figure 2.  Effect of     on incentive to act
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ˆ( )Le δ
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Figure 3.  Buyout value and biosecurity costs supporting 
the four different cases
eˆ
,
D
na ncΦ K
e
(0,0)
Case B,
( , )na nc
Case D,
( , )a c
Case C,
( , )na c
Case A,
( , )a nc ( )e K
( )e K+
Figure 4.  Fixed point for w, the measure of diseased farms, 
as buyout payment changes
w
Τ
(0,0) ,
h
D
na nc
K K=
≥ Φ ,
l
D
na nc
K K=
< Φ
 3
Figure 5.  Voluntary depopulation scheme and acting farms
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